was pressed to the front to reinforce the patriotic purpose. It had gradually become evident that President Johnson, whether such had been his original design or not,—probably not—would by his political course he led into the Democratic party. The Democrats, delighted of course with the prospect of capturing a President elected by the Republicans, zealously supported his measures, and flattered his vanity without stint. The old alliance between the pro-slavery sentiment in the South and the Democratic party in the North was thus revived—that alliance which had already cost the South so dearly in the recent past by making Southern people believe that if they revolted against the Federal Government, the Northern Democracy would stand by them and help them to victory. A similar delusion was now encouraged again by the attitude of the Northern Democrats; and the " States lately in rebellion,[9]* if reconstructed on the Johnson plan, could be counted upon to send a solidly Democratic delegation to Congress. That delegation would even become proportionately stronger in number than before, since the negro population, only three-fifths of whom had been counted in the basis of representation when they were in slavery, were now as free people counted in full, although they might not be permitted to vote. There was an apprehension that the delegations from the " States lately in rebellion/* if so reconstructed, united with the

Northern Democrats, might obtain the control of Congress, and then not only imdo all legislation had done for the protection of the freedmen,—so as to turn them over helplessly to the mercies of the master class, but also attack the national debt either by repudiating it directly or by making it payable in depreciated paper money* This apprehension was by no means altogether unfounded, for it was not only natural that the South should be overwhelmiigly *m* favor of such direct or indirect repudiation,